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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that the year is 2020, and Russia has successfully annexed 
half of Ukraine, fully integrating it into its territory. The Putin regime 
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decides to track down all of the businesses owned by individuals, both 
Ukrainian nationals and foreigners, who opposed the territory’s 
incorporation into Russia. Once Putin identifies the offenders, he persuades 
prosecutors to bring trumped-up charges against each entity for tax evasion, 
fraud, and corruption. While the businesses contest these charges in court, 
the vast majority of them lose, and they are compelled to pay astronomical 
sums in fines and damages. As a result, the businesses are forced into 
bankruptcy and a Russian court appoints two liquidators to oversee the 
bankruptcy proceedings: one to represent the interests of the businesses, 
and the other to represent the interests of the state (from whom the 
businesses had received substantial loans). 
The shareholders of one affected business, Enterprise X, see the 
writing on the wall and file a complaint against Russia with the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging a violation of the right to 
property. The shareholders, who come from many different countries, 
argue that Russia’s actions constitute an impermissible interference with 
their shares in the company (as explained below, a protected form of 
property), and they claim damages to compensate them for their losses. 
However, the ECHR dismisses their complaint, holding that the 
shareholders themselves were not injured by Russia’s actions, since 
Enterprise X itself could have brought the suit to the ECHR through its two 
liquidators. Of course, the liquidators (both of whom were appointed by a 
Russian court, and not chosen by the shareholders) did not do so. The 
practical result of this ruling is that the shareholders’ investments in the 
companies were entirely lost. 
The possibility of these events occurring is not so farfetched. The 
Putin regime in Russia has been more than willing to seize the assets of its 
critics,1 and the facts of this hypothetical are based on the facts from the 
ECHR’s seminal case on shareholder rights.2 This hypothetical highlights 
how the ECHR’s current approach to shareholder standing can lead to 
unjust results, and why the ECHR should adopt a new standard. As 
explained below, the ECHR’s current rule for deciding whether 
shareholders can bring claims directly to the Court lacks clarity, and is 
 
 1.   See Megan Davies and Douglas Busvine, With Khodorovsky out, Yukos investors fight on, 
REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/12/us-russia-yukos-
idUSBREA1B 
1BN20140212 (explaining that the oil group, Yukos, is accusing Russia of imposing fake taxes and 
stealing assets to bankrupt the company); see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Yukos Majority Shareholders 
Hit a $50 Billion Gusher, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (July 28, 2014), available at http://www.american 
lawyer.com/id=1202664699487 (stating that an arbitration tribunal has held the Russian Federation 
liable for $50.02 billion for seizing the assets of AOA Yukos Oil Company). 
 2.  See generally Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1995). 
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based on outdated reasoning. It is time for a new approach to take its place. 
Readers unfamiliar with the ECHR may be surprised by the very idea 
that corporate shareholders are able to assert any claims before a human 
rights tribunal.3 However, one of the cornerstones of the ECHR’s 
jurisprudence is its consistent protection of the right to property.4 This right 
to property, as both the Court and scholars have made clear, includes the 
right to own shares in a corporation.5 In addition, the protection of property 
is not limited to natural persons; the right of “legal persons” (in other 
words, corporations and other entities) to be free from harm done to their 
property is also enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention 
(Protocol 1).6 Corporations have successfully brought suit at the ECHR 
against governments who have unlawfully interfered with their property 
interests in numerous cases, and the Court has awarded these corporations 
significant damage awards.7 
However, the Court has often not been as welcoming towards 
 
 3.  See Anna Grear, REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE 
LEGAL HUMANITY 23–49 (Chistien Van Den Anker ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) (discussing and 
challenging the theoretical underpinnings of granting human rights to corporations under the ECHR). 
 4.  See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2008) (“[T]he ECHR’s adjudication of 
property rights claims by business entities is indisputably authorized by Article 1’s text and the intent of 
its drafters.”); Winfried H.A.M. van den Muijsenbergh & Sam Rezai, Corporations and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 43, 44–68 (2012) 
(arguing that corporations rightfully have a place in the European human rights regime). 
 5.  See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law 
and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 743, 753 
(Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007) (“[S]hares undoubtedly [have] an economic value and 
constitute[] ‘possessions.’”); see MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: 
EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF ECHR PROTECTION 67, 70 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) [hereinafter 
Emberland, Human Rights of Companies] (“[a] share itself is the shareholder’s property and is 
considered as such by international law.”); see also Bramelid and Malmstrom v. Sweden, App. Nos. 
8588/79 and 8589/79, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64, 81 (1982) (determining that shares of a 
company were ‘possessions’ that triggered the right of ownership under Protocol 1). 
 6.  Protocol to the Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol 1] (“Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Uniya OOO v. Russia, App. Nos. 4437/03 and 13290/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., § 351 
(2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144946 (awarding one 
of the applicant corporations over 3 million euros in damages for Russia’s violation of its Protocol 1 
right); Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117596 (awarding the applicant corporation 
damages of 10 million euros as a result of a violation of its Protocol 1 right to property, in addition to 
other rights that the Italian government had violated); see also David Anderson, Compensation for 
Interference With Property, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 543, 543-58 (1999) (discussing the ECHR’s 
practice of compensating aggrieved parties for interference with property). 
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shareholders who attempt to bring claims at the ECHR. In 1995, the Court 
adopted a strict test for determining whether or not shareholders meet the 
“victim” requirements of Article 34 of the European Convention, which 
determines standing before the Court.8 Under Agrotexim v. Greece, the 
Court only grants shareholders victim status, and therefore standing, in the 
following “exceptional” circumstance: where it is “clearly established that 
it is impossible for the company to apply to the Convention institutions 
through the organs set up under its articles of incorporation or—in the 
event of liquidation—through its liquidators.”9 This test, derived from the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) holding in Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited, has presented a significant barrier to 
shareholders seeking redress under the European Convention ever since the 
decision was issued.10 
Although the test to determine shareholder standing appears 
straightforward, in practice the Court has not applied it consistently, 
arguably starting with the Agrotexim case itself.11 One commentator has 
characterized the Court’s approach since Agrotexim as “subscribing to a 
pragmatic outlook under the pretence [sic] of formalism.”12 As a result, 
prospective shareholder applicants have been left with a tangled maze of 
jurisprudence based on outdated reasoning, leading to a lack of clarity and 
potentially unjust results.13 Therefore, the ECHR should abandon its 
current standard and adopt a more realistic multifactor test that would allow 
shareholders to seek redress at the Court when their property rights—and 
not merely their financial interests—have been infringed by the 
 
 8.  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention] (“The Court may receive applications 
from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a 
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the 
protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.”). 
 9.  Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 10.  See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, 43. 
 11.  See infra Part I (discussing the Court’s reasoning in Agrotexim). 
 12.  Marius Emberland, The Corporate Veil in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 63 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L LAW 945, 954 (2003) [hereinafter Emberland, Corporate Veil]. 
 13.  Compare Agroxtexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (not granting shareholder applicants 
standing) with Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, App. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44 (2002) 
(granting shareholder applicants standing without any real discussion of whether or not they met the 
requirements of Article 34). See also OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment ¶ 1 (2012) (granting standing to the applicant shareholders without a discussion 
of whether they met the requirements of Article 34); but see OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. 
Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment on Just Satisfaction (2014) (Bushev, J., dissenting 
in part) (“We believe that the majority has in essence departed from the Court’s case-law regarding the 
criteria for assessing a company’s shareholders as victims and injured parties.”). 
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government. 
The test should include the following factors: whether the shareholder 
claimed that one of its legal rights was infringed (as opposed to a claim that 
the government harmed its monetary interests), to what extent the 
shareholder exercised control over the company, to what extent it was 
impossible for the company itself to file suit at the ECHR, and the severity 
of the harm that the shareholder suffered. 
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will analyze and explain 
the reasoning of Agrotexim in order to set the stage for the rest of the 
ECHR’s shareholder rights jurisprudence. It will also discuss Barcelona 
Traction, an ICJ judgment upon which the ECHR relied heavily to 
establish its test for shareholder standing in Agrotexim.14 Part II will 
explain the criticism that has been levied against the Barcelona Traction 
standard and examine the Court’s more recent jurisprudence on the 
protection (or lack thereof) of shareholders. It will pay particular attention 
to the inconsistencies in the Court’s analyses of the factors that it considers. 
Finally, Part III will argue that the Court should abandon its current 
standard in favor of a more pragmatic and straightforward test that 
adequately protects shareholders when they are otherwise unable to seek 
redress. 
I. THE SOURCE OF THE ECHR’S INADEQUATE TREATMENT OF 
SHAREHOLDERS: AGROTEXIM V. GREECE 
Despite the ECHR’s willingness to protect corporate property under 
Protocol 1,15 the Court has been far more restrictive when reviewing 
shareholders’ claims.16 As introduced above, the main obstacle for 
shareholders is Article 34 of the European Convention, which defines the 
“victim” requirement in order to appear at the ECHR.17  Under the Court’s 
current jurisprudence, shareholders are not “victims” unless the injury 
directly harms shareholder property, or violates one of the legal rights that 
shareholders enjoy, such as dividends issued, voting rights, or the right to a 
 
 14.  See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 85, 92–93. 
 15.  See Protocol 1, supra note 6; see also Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, 332 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 43 (1995) (holding that the Protocol 1 right of the corporate applicants had been 
violated, resulting in an indirect expropriation of the applicants’ property). 
 16.  See, e.g., Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A); CDI Holding Aktiengesellschaft and Others 
v. Slovakia, App. No. 37398/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., Decision as to Admissibility ¶ 4 (2001) (“no such 
exceptional circumstances [that would merit standing] have been established in the present case.”). 
 17.  European Convention, supra note 8, art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications from any 
person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation 
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto.”). 
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share in a company’s assets after liquidation. Importantly, matters that 
“concern the corporate person” do not necessarily confer victim status on 
the shareholders of that corporate person.18 In order to explain the creation 
of this standard, this section discusses the ECHR’s reasoning in Agrotexim, 
the problems with its rationale, and the origins of the Agrotexim standard in 
the Barcelona Traction case. 
A. The Court’s reasoning in Agrotexim 
The foundational case in the ECHR’s jurisprudence on shareholder 
property rights is Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, decided in 1995.19 In 
Agrotexim, the applicants were six limited liability companies who 
collectively owned a majority of the shares of a large Greek brewery.20 The 
brewery was very heavily indebted to the National Bank of Greece, and the 
Government ultimately ordered its liquidation.21 Under a special 
bankruptcy procedure, two liquidators were appointed by the Athens Court 
of Appeal and were required to act in concert to manage the bankruptcy.22 
One liquidator was charged with representing the interests of the National 
Bank of Greece, the brewery’s main creditor, and the other was charged 
with representing the interests of the brewery’s management.23 However, 
the brewery alleged that it did not go bankrupt by its own fault. Instead, it 
argued that the Athens Municipal Council purposefully destroyed the 
brewery by announcing its intention to expropriate the land where two of 
the brewery’s factories sat.24 The brewery claimed that this public 
announcement sabotaged its liquidation sale of the factories by scaring off 
all potential buyers. Accordingly, the land was not sold but instead claimed 
by the government, to the great financial detriment of the brewery’s 
shareholders.25 The shareholders brought claims under Protocol 1, alleging 
 
 18.  See Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 5, at 71. 
 19.  330 Eur. Ct. H.R 3 (ser. A) (1995). 
 20.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 21.  Id. ¶¶ 7, 17. 
 22.  Id. ¶ 20; Agrotexim Hellas S.A. and Others v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep., ¶¶ 25–26, 29 (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search. 
aspx?i=001-45639. Importantly, the facts according to the ECHR and the European Commission differ 
on this point. See infra Part I.B for a discussion describing one of the most interesting facts that was left 
out by the ECHR, but included by the European Commission: the process of how the liquidators were 
appointed. 
 23.  Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 20. It is also important to note that in 1991 (after the 
shareholders filed suit at the ECHR), these two liquidators were replaced by a single liquidator 
designated by the Bank, because “there had been an unjustified delay in the sale” of two of the 
properties in question. Id. ¶ 36. 
 24.  Id. ¶¶ 22–34. 
 25.  Id. ¶¶ 34, 37–38. 
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that their right to property had been violated.26 
The European Commission was the first entity to treat the applicants’ 
claims, declaring them admissible and finding that the applicants’ Protocol 
1 right to property had been violated.27 In addressing the issue of whether 
the shareholders had standing, the Commission noted that:  
[T]he applicant’s [sic] rights at issue are their rights as majority 
shareholders in the [brewery]. The measures complained of were 
directed against the company but also indirectly affected the 
applicant’s [sic] rights. Consequently, insofar as there has been an 
interference with the company’s property rights, this interference 
must be considered to extend to the applicants’ property rights as 
well.28  
Accordingly, the European Commission’s view of the situation was clear: 
as majority shareholders, the applicants’ property rights had been 
negatively affected by the actions of the Greek Government, resulting in a 
violation of their rights under the European Convention. 
The European Commission then referred the case to the ECHR for its 
decision.29 The majority of the Court, in an 8-1 vote, dismissed the 
applicants’ submission on the ground that it failed to meet the victim 
requirement.30 The Court declined to follow the European Commission’s 
reasoning because there were too many “risks and difficulties” in applying 
it, including problems with determining who is entitled to bring suit before 
the ECHR, and with the requirement of exhausting local remedies.31 
 
 26.  Id. ¶ 54. The shareholders also brought claims under Articles 6 and 13, alleging rights to a fair 
trial and an effective remedy, respectively. Id. Interestingly, the Court has more recently ruled that 
Article 6 claims brought by shareholders are also subject to the Agrotexim test, although that issue was 
not discussed in Agrotexim itself. See Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 951 (“in its two 
most recent considerations on the merits of a corporate veil claim . . . the Court cited Agrotexim as the 
prevailing formula for deciding on the admissibility of claims which concerned Article 6(l).”). 
 27. See Agrotexim Hellas S.A., Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 51. The Commission did not find violations 
of the applicants’ rights under Articles 6 and 13. For reference, prior to the adoption of Protocol 11 to 
the European Convention in 1994, individuals did not have the right of direct access to the ECHR. 
Instead, they had to first submit their claims to the European Commission, which considered 
admissibility, and issued a non-binding report on the admissibility and the merits. Since Protocol 11 
entered into force, individuals apply directly to the ECHR. See Explanatory Report: Protocol No. 11 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the 
control machinery established thereby, Nov. 1, 1998, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/155.htm. 
 28.  Agrotexim Hellas S.A., Eur. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 59. 
 29.  Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1995); NETHERLANDS 
INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, UTRECHT SCHOOL OF LAW (Jan. 13, 2014, 4:18 PM), http://sim.law.uu. 
nl/SIM/CaseLaw/hof.nsf/bd85b31af932d14bc1256681002b47f0/c56b38a2f3aa24c4c1256640004c2c98
?OpenDocument. 
 30.  Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶  71. 
 31.  Id. ¶¶ 65–66. Under the domestic law of many member states, shareholders do not have 
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Instead, the Court held that: 
[T]he piercing of the “corporate veil” or the disregarding of a 
company’s legal personality will be justified only in exceptional 
circumstances, in particular where it is clearly established that it is 
impossible for the company to apply to the Convention institutions 
through the organs set up under its articles of incorporation or—in 
the event of liquidation—through its liquidators.32 
In rejecting the applicants’ submissions, the Court found that there 
were no exceptional circumstances present in the case, because the 
company still technically existed as a legal entity at the time that the 
shareholders filed suit.33 The shareholders were left completely empty-
handed, with nothing to show for their investments.34 
B. Bad facts make for bad law 
Since reasonable minds disagree about the Court’s legal reasoning in 
Agrotexim, it is important to consider the facts of the case in order to 
understand how the Court arrived at its conclusion. After all, Agrotexim 
was a case of first impression for the ECHR on shareholder standing.35 
Unfortunately, the classic truism that “bad facts make for bad law” appears 
to be applicable to the ECHR’s ultimate analysis. The Court acknowledged 
that “the specific circumstances of each case” must be considered in 
determining whether to grant shareholders victim status separate from that 
of the corporation.36 However, it glossed over several very important facts 
that were pertinent to the applicants’ complaint.37 Although commentators 
have criticized parts of the Court’s reasoning and analysis in Agrotexim, 
they have not fully examined the facts of the case.38 A detailed review of 
the facts reveals that the Court may have erroneously concluded that the 
liquidators adequately represented the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.39 
First, and perhaps most worrisome, was the Court’s finding that the 
 
separate standing to bring suit for actions that are detrimental to the company in which they own stock. 
 32.  Id. ¶ 66. 
 33.  Id. ¶¶ 67–68 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See generally id. 
 36.  Id. ¶ 63. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See, e.g., Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 960–62 (arguing that some of the 
Court’s analysis does not “provide a satisfactory explanation for non-identification”). Emberland goes 
on to explain his argument that even though the Court’s textual reasoning may leave something to 
desire in Agrotexim, the larger structural context of the European Union is sufficient to support the 
principle of non-identification. Id. at 962–66. 
 39.  See infra Part I.B. 
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brewery would have been able to bring the suit to the ECHR itself at the 
time that the applicant shareholders filed their complaint.40 The European 
Commission came to the very opposite conclusion, despite having access to 
the same information from the parties.41 It determined that, due to the 
special liquidation procedure, the brewery was “essentially and effectively 
under the control of the State so that it was not reasonably an option for the 
company to lodge a complaint against Greece.”42 
The Court rejected the Commission’s conclusion for four reasons.43 
First, the brewery “had not ceased to exist as a legal person” at the time of 
the applicants’ complaint, despite being in full liquidation.44 Second, the 
Court gave weight to the fact that the Business Revival Agency, an agency 
of the Greek state, was not managing the brewery directly.45 Instead, two 
state-appointed liquidators appointed by the Athens Court of Appeal were 
managing it.46 Third, the Court noted that the liquidators appeared to have 
acted properly by taking “all the measures that they considered to be in the 
interests of [the brewery’s] assets.”47 Finally, if the applicants had been 
dissatisfied with the liquidators, the applicants could have “taken steps” to 
have them replaced.48 
Even assuming these facts are all true, the Court never directly 
engaged with the applicants’ main argument that the liquidators had 
“exclusive power to manage and represent the company,” making it 
impossible for the company to file suit.49 Surprisingly, the ECHR even 
cited the Athens Court of Appeal’s decision appointing two liquidators: 
“after [the appointment of a liquidator], the powers of the executive organs 
of [the company] to manage and represent the business are removed and 
vested in the liquidator.”50 If management no longer controlled or exercised 
influence over the brewery, but the state-appointed liquidators had full 
control, then it is difficult to understand the Court’s evaluation of the 
 
 40.  Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 68–71. 
 41.  See generally, Agrotexim Hellas S.A. and Others v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1994). 
 42.  Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 63 (emphasis added). 
 43.  Id. ¶¶ 68–70. 
 44.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 45.  Id. ¶ 69. 
 46.  Id. In the Court’s view, this supported Greece’s argument that the brewery was not being 
directly controlled by the state. Id. ¶ 67. 
 47.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 48.  Id. Clearly, “taken steps” could mean anything, but the Court chose not to suggest possible 
and realistic actions that the shareholders could have taken to have the liquidators replaced. 
 49.  Id. ¶ 61. 
 50.  Id. ¶ 20. 
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situation.51 Furthermore, the Court noted that the liquidators took some 
post-bankruptcy actions that suggested they might not have been acting 
dutifully as agents of the brewery—most importantly, their decision to not 
appeal adverse court decisions.52 Despite acknowledging these facts, the 
Court did not provide other facts to demonstrate that the liquidators were 
indeed acting properly on behalf of the shareholders. Therefore, it is 
unclear how the Court arrived at its conclusion that it was still possible for 
the company to file suit, when the facts appear to demonstrate that this was 
no longer a possibility. 
Furthermore, it is important to note a fairly significant inconsistency 
between the facts of the case as presented in the European Commission’s 
earlier decision and the facts presented in the ECHR’s decision.53 This 
inconsistency further underscores the possibility that the Court did not fully 
consider whether the state-appointed liquidators were acting as agents of 
the company. The European Commission noted that at the shareholders’ 
meeting before liquidation, the shareholders voted to appoint a sole 
liquidator to exclusively represent the interests of the company.54 This sole 
liquidator, designated by the shareholders, not by the Athens Court of 
Appeal, dutifully brought actions against Greece, the City of Athens, and 
the mayor of Athens in his personal capacity.55 
The events that followed, as presented in the European Commission’s 
decision, demonstrate that the ECHR did not adequately consider the 
applicants’ argument that the state-appointed liquidators were not acting in 
the interests of the company or the shareholders.56 It was only after the sole 
liquidator filed the aforementioned lawsuits that the Greek government 
decided to intervene: “[u]pon request of the Greek State, in its capacity of 
creditor of the [brewery], the Minister for Economic Affairs ordered . . . the 
 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  For example, immediately after the liquidators were appointed by the Athens Court of 
Appeal, the Athens Court of First Instance dismissed the two civil actions that the brewery had lodged, 
holding that (1) the acts of the Athens Municipal Council could not be regarded as administrative acts 
that caused damage to the company’s property rights, and (2) that neither the decisions of the Athens 
Municipal Council nor its public statements about taking the property gave rise to liability requiring 
compensation. Id. ¶ 21. The two liquidators did not appeal these judgments, and they accordingly 
became final. Id. 
 53.  See Agrotexim Hellas S.A. and Others v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep., ¶¶ 25–26, 29 (1994). 
 54.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 55.  Id. ¶ 26. By contrast, the ECHR wrote that the shareholders appointed two liquidators at their 
meeting, and does not make clear that these shareholders were replaced outright by the ones appointed 
by the Athens Court of Appeal. See Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶¶ 15, 
20 (1995). 
 56.  Agrotexim Hellas S.A., Eur. Comm’n H.R., ¶¶ 27, 29. 
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winding up of the company under the provisions of [the applicable law].”57 
After accepting an application made by the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
the Athens Court of Appeal replaced the sole liquidator appointed by the 
shareholders with two that it appointed itself: one to represent the interests 
of the National Bank of Greece, and the other to represent the interests of 
the company.58 With the Minister for Economic Affairs directing the 
winding up of the company, as well as initiating the action to replace the 
liquidator appointed by the shareholders, it leaves even more doubt that the 
liquidators who were appointed by the Athens Court of Appeal were acting 
in the interests of the company. 
The ECHR’s decision, by contrast, states that the shareholders 
appointed two liquidators at their shareholders’ meeting.59 More 
importantly, it does not make it clear that these two liquidators were fully 
replaced by order of the Athens Court of Appeal.60 It is unclear why the 
ECHR did not address these facts in its decision. Regardless, two state-
appointed liquidators replaced the actor who the shareholders 
independently chose to represent their interests. 
Relying on the formalistic view of the brewery’s continued existence 
as a legal person, despite the fact that its management was no longer in 
control, the Court proceeded in its analysis without seriously questioning 
the liquidators’ representation of the brewery.61 The Court reasoned that the 
liquidators could legally represent the brewery and bring suits on its behalf, 
if they felt that it was necessary.62 However, when one of the liquidators is 
a direct agent of the state that has allegedly interfered with the company’s 
property in the first place, and the liquidators were ordered to act in 
concert, does it truly seem plausible that the liquidators would protect the 
rights of the company to the extent that management otherwise would? The 
European Commission followed this more skeptical line of reasoning, 
determining that it was likely that “the state appointed liquidator would 
refuse to take action against the municipal authorities of Athens, another 
(albeit local) part of the Greek State.”63  The Court should have engaged 
 
 57.  Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added). 
 58.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 59.  Ultimately, it is unclear whether the European Commission or the ECHR is correct as to the 
number of liquidators who were appointed by the shareholders. 
 60.  See Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶¶ 15, 20 (describing the Athens Court of 
Appeal’s appointment of the two new liquidators, but never explicitly says that they replaced the ones 
chosen by the shareholders). 
 61.  See id. ¶¶ 66, 68. 
 62.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 63.  Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 952. Furthermore, the Court wrote that victim 
status would only be granted in cases where it was “impossible for the company to apply to the 
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with the applicants’ control argument more seriously, rather than 
superficially rejecting it on formalistic grounds. 
Furthermore, the ECHR analysis mischaracterized the European 
Commission’s finding that the applicants met the victim requirements of 
Article 34, and that Greece violated the applicants’ rights under Protocol 
1.64 The ECHR framed the European Commission’s decision as simply 
stating that if shareholders experience any loss in the value of their shares, 
then a Protocol 1 violation is present.65 This was not the Commission’s 
conclusion; on the contrary, the Commission specifically stated that it was 
the quality of the shareholders as majority shareholders, and not merely any 
effects on their financial interests, that implicated their rights.66 
Additionally, the Commission noted that the rights infringed were the 
company’s property rights as a result of the Greek government’s de facto 
expropriation, thereby “indirectly affecting” the applicant shareholders’ 
rights as well.67 Again, it was not merely the diminution in the value of the 
applicants’ shares that gave rise to a violation. The ECHR’s 
mischaracterization of the European Commission’s decision is unwise and 
unworkable. However, as explained below, the alternative that the ECHR 
created is not at all preferable.68 
The final problem with the ECHR’s decision is the test that it created 
for determining shareholder standing in future cases.69 Specifically, the 
Court offered no guidelines for delineating the standard that it would use to 
determine the Article 34 victim status of future applicant shareholders. It 
wrote that granting shareholders separate victim status from the company 
“will be justified only in exceptional circumstances, in particular where it is 
clearly established that it is impossible for the company to apply to the 
Convention institutions . . .”70 In the rest of the opinion, there is no further 
 
Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of incorporation or—in the event of 
liquidation—through its liquidators.” Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66. However, it seems 
strange to assume that such a liquidator would be fully acting in the interests of the company when it 
was the government that interfered with the property in the first place. 
 64.  Agrotexim Hellas S.A. and Others v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep., ¶¶ 47, 59 (1994). 
 65.  See Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 64 (“[T]he Commission seems to accept that 
where a violation of a company’s rights protected by [Protocol 1] results in a fall of the value of its 
shares, there is automatically an infringement of the shareholders’ rights under that Article.”). 
 66.  Agrotexim Hellas S.A., Eur. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 59. As majority shareholders, the applicants’ 
rights were infringed because their ownership of the company was harmed by the de facto 
expropriation. The same would not be true for minority shareholders. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See infra Part II (discussing the problems with the current test). 
 69.  See Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66. 
 70.  Id. 
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mention of what would constitute “exceptional circumstances.” While the 
Court has clarified this phrase in later cases, it has done so in a piecemeal 
way, depriving potential applicants of any predictable means of knowing 
whether or not their particular case would meet the requirements of Article 
34.71 
Overall, the ECHR’s treatment of the facts in Agrotexim leaves serious 
concerns about the factual basis for the shareholder standing test that it 
developed from that case. As a result, the validity of that test must be called 
into question. The Court evidently viewed the facts in a certain light and 
applied its reasoning and the practice of other courts in a manner that was 
not necessarily appropriate. In order to demonstrate this latter point, the 
next section will address the legal analysis of Barcelona Traction, the case 
that appears to be the ECHR’s main source of inspiration for its Agrotexim 
test. 
C. The Court’s inspiration: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited 
The ECHR wrote that the “non-identification” principle (namely, not 
granting shareholders standing independently from their company) that it 
adopted in Agrotexim came from “[t]he Supreme Courts of certain member 
States of the Council of Europe” and the International Court of Justice, 
specifically the Barcelona Traction case.72 Barcelona Traction was a 
landmark case decided in 1970 between Spain and Belgium at the ICJ.73 
For the first time, the ICJ addressed the question of to what extent 
shareholders had standing under customary international law for purposes 
of diplomatic protection.74 Specifically, Belgium attempted to sue Spain on 
behalf of Belgian shareholders who represented almost 90% of the 
shareholders of the Barcelona Traction Company.75 Belgium argued that 
 
 71.  Compare Pine Valley Dev. Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57711 (granting victim status 
to a shareholder applicant under the “mere vehicle” rationale), with Credit & Indus. Bank v. the Czech 
Republic, App. No. 29010/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51 (2003) (unreported) (granting victim status to a 
shareholder applicant because the “essence of the complaint” was that the company had not been given 
a chance to contest the appointment of a compulsory administrator in bankruptcy). See also infra Part 
II.B for an explanation of the fragmented line of cases treating shareholder rights post-Agrotexim, and 
Part III.A.2 for a longer discussion of Pine Valley. 
 72.  Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66. 
 73.  Id. (citing Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1). The 
reasoning and outcome of Barcelona Traction has since been cast into doubt by scholars and 
practitioners. See infra Part I.D. 
 74.  See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 1; Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 
5, at 71–72 (discussing the case’s relevance for the ECHR). 
 75.  See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 24–25. 
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Spain had expropriated the company immediately after World War II 
without ever paying compensation.76 
The majority of the ICJ determined that Belgium did not have 
standing to bring suit on behalf of its shareholders.77 However, the ICJ also 
discussed whether the shareholders themselves could have separate claims 
from Barcelona Traction as a company.78 In dicta, which is where the 
ECHR later found the substance for its test in Agrotexim, the Court 
distinguished between shareholder rights and shareholder interests.79 
Shareholder rights would be entitled to protection because they gave rise to 
an independent cause of action, including the right to dividends issued, 
voting rights, and “the right to a share in a company’s residual assets after 
liquidation.”80 Shareholder interests, on the other hand, would not enjoy 
protection.81 Interests do not give rise to an independent victim status 
because they are merely financial and linked to the existence of the 
company itself.82  The majority wrote that “whenever a shareholder’s 
interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he 
must look to institute appropriate action: for although two separate entities 
may have suffered from the same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights 
have been infringed.”83 
Furthermore, the majority of the ICJ was adamant about the 
requirement that it must be impossible for a company to bring suit by itself 
 
 76.  See id. ¶¶ 9–10. For a much longer and excellent analysis of the facts of the Barcelona 
Traction case, see generally Rupert Coldwell, The Limited Protection of Corporations and 
Shareholders at International Law, 14 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 358, 361–63 (2011); Laurence 
Jahoon Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting its Customary and Policy 
Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 237, 275 (2006); Brigitte Stern, La protection 
diplomatique des investissements internationaux—de Barcelona Traction à Elettronica Sicula ou les 
glissements progressifs de l’analyse, 117 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 897, 897–948 (1990). 
 77.  Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 103. 
 78.  Id. ¶¶ 34–45. 
 79.  Id. ¶ 37. 
 80.  Christoph Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law, in COMMON 
VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 601, 616 (Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Bardo Fassbender, Malcolm N. Shaw, Karl-Peter Sommermann, eds., 2006); Barcelona 
Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 47; Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 
I.C.J. 15, ¶ 106. Interestingly, the ECHR’s decision in Agrotexim did not address this last right, and 
instead relied on the brewery’s alleged continued ability to pursue claims itself (in other words, the lack 
of impossibility). 
 81.  See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 37. 
 82.  See id.; see also Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 946 (“[T]he corporate veil 
presupposes a fundamental distinction between shareholder rights, which belong to the shareholder 
directly, and shareholder interests in the company, which are not thought of as pertaining to the 
shareholder person but rather the company as such.”). 
 83.  Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 44. 
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in order to grant shareholders standing, such as when the company is in 
“legal demise” and its shareholders have no other way to obtain a remedy.84 
Interestingly, in support of its argument, the ICJ relied on the fact that 
Barcelona Traction had been in receivership at the time of the filing of the 
complaint, not in liquidation.85 Generally, liquidation is understood as a 
process that terminates the existence of a company, while receivership has 
been described as a process that “foster[s] the assets” of a company that is 
in financial trouble.86 The ICJ specifically distinguished between these two 
legal statuses, and wrote: “[f]ar from implying the demise of the entity or 
of its rights, [the status of receivership] much rather denotes that those 
rights are preserved for so long as no liquidation has ensued.”87 While a 
company under a receivership would be “limited in its activity,” it would 
nevertheless be able to “retain[] its legal capacity” and “the power to 
exercise” that capacity through its manager appointed by a court.88 
It is curious that, despite the ICJ’s explicit distinction, the ECHR 
nevertheless adopted the Barcelona Traction test in Agrotexim, a case in 
which the corporation was well underway in the liquidation process at the 
time of the shareholders’ complaint to the Court.89 While the ECHR could 
have interpreted Article 34 in a way that was completely independent of the 
Barcelona Traction case, its explicit and approving citation to the decision 
indicates that at the very least, Barcelona Traction heavily influenced the 
decision in Agrotexim.90 After all, as one commentator has noted, the 
ECHR is “clearly not bound by rules or principles confirmed by another 
international court in a different, albeit partly related, part of international 
law.”91 It is therefore unclear why the ECHR nevertheless chose to adopt 
this particular test. 
This section has explained the ECHR’s shareholder standing 
jurisprudence through an analysis of Agrotexim, the problematic factual 
inquiry that the ECHR performed in that case, and the origins of the legal 
 
 84.  Id. ¶ 66 (“Only in the event of the legal demise of the company are the shareholders deprived 
of the possibility of a remedy available through the company; it is only if they became deprived of all 
such possibility that an independent right of action for them and their government could arise.”). 
 85.  See id. ¶ 67. 
 86.  See, e.g., People of Mich. v. Mich. Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344 (1932) (holding that taxes 
that accrued while the receiver had control of the company were considered “expenses of 
administration” because the company continued to operate and exist, and therefore the taxes had 
priority over the claims of unsecured creditors). 
 87.  Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 67. 
 88.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 89.  See Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66 (1995). 
 90.  See id. ¶ 66. 
 91.  Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 5, at 89. 
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standard that it ultimately borrowed from the dicta of Barcelona Traction. 
Part II will discuss the criticisms of Barcelona Traction, and it will explain 
how the Agrotexim standard—the product of problematic facts and 
questionable law—has led to inconsistent results for shareholders before 
the ECHR. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEMS UNDER THE CURRENT 
APPROACH OF THE ECHR 
As discussed in Part I, the Agrotexim test was based on facts that did 
not necessarily support the standard that the ECHR eventually adopted, a 
standard that was itself borrowed from the ICJ’s dicta analysis in 
Barcelona Traction. In addition to the problematic factual issues already 
raised, Part II will first explain the criticism that has been levied against 
Barcelona Traction. It will then argue that this criticism demonstrates that 
the original justifications for using the Barcelona Traction test may no 
longer be appropriate, and that the value of continuing to borrow this test 
may be limited. Part II will also describe how the ECHR, using a test that is 
based on unclear facts and Barcelona Traction’s outdated standard, has 
inconsistently treated shareholders who attempt to bring claims before it. 
A. Moving away from Barcelona Traction: the modern approach 
In the nearly fifty years since its adoption, Barcelona Traction’s rigid 
test has been widely criticized as outdated by scholars and practitioners, 
primarily in the fields of international investment law and international 
arbitration. One scholar has written that the case is “venerable but 
obsolete,” and it has left uncertainty in international law that even the 
International Law Commission has been unable to resolve.92 The main 
criticism argues that since Barcelona Traction was decided in 1970, there 
has been an increased willingness in international tribunals to allow 
shareholders to have independent standing from the corporations in which 
they invest, demonstrating that Barcelona Traction’s continued relevance is 
questionable.93 For example, an arbitral tribunal at the International Centre 
 
 92.  See Lee, supra note 76, at 275 (discussing the repercussions of Barcelona Traction primarily 
for bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment). Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to 
write that Barcelona Traction “no longer reflects the current state of international law.” Schreuer, supra  
note 80, at 601–02, quoting Ian A. Laird, A Community of Destiny—The Barcelona Traction Case and 
the Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 77 (Todd Weiler, ed., 2005). 
 93.  See, e.g., Schreuer, supra note 80, at 601–02 (discussing the impact of Barcelona Traction in 
international investment arbitration proceedings). 
16_TISHLER_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2015  10:44 PM 
2014] A NEW APPROACH TO SHAREHOLDER STANDING 275 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) determined that a group of 
shareholders had standing because there were no principles in “general 
international law” that prohibited the treaty governing their investment 
from granting standing to shareholders (even minority shareholders).94 
Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to write that Barcelona Traction “no 
longer reflects the current state of international law.”95 
Particularly when one considers the willingness of states to grant 
shareholders separate standing in bilateral investment treaties,96 it appears 
that, at least in the area of public international law, states are increasingly 
willing to envision legal regimes that grant shareholders independent rights 
from their respective companies.97 Even the ICJ itself has arguably started 
to “implicitly reject” the purely formalistic principle of Barcelona Traction 
in favor of a new pragmatic approach.98 
In particular, the Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), 
casts doubt on the continued strength and scope of Barcelona Traction.99 In 
Elettronica Sicula, the ICJ allowed a claim from the United States to be 
brought against Italy on behalf of U.S. shareholders under an investment 
treaty from 1948.100 Although the claim was ultimately unsuccessful, the 
case was remarkable because the ICJ side-stepped its reasoning from 
Barcelona Traction. The tribunal did not even analyze the issue of harm 
 
 94.  Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
729, 752 (2012), citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Decision of Sept 25, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 1136, 1144–45. 
 95.  Schreuer, supra note 80, at 601–02 (quoting Laird, supra note 92, at 77). 
 96.  See, e.g., Patrick Dumberry, The Legal Standing of Shareholders Before International 
Investment Tribunals—Has Any Rule of Customary International Law Crystallized?, 18 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 353, 360 (2010) (explaining that “the legal protection for shareholders of corporations 
investing abroad is offered through the existence of a growing number of bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties.”). 
 97.  See Lee, supra note 76, at 270–71 (“[I]n practice, BITs and ICSID grant standing more 
liberally than does Barcelona Traction . . . [s]hareholders need not wait for the corporation itself to 
make a claim against a host state . . . [c]orporations, their shareholders (natural or legal persons), and 
their respective states of nationality all may bring claims against the host state.”). 
 98.  See, e.g., Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 
(Judgment of July 20, 1989) (holding that a bilateral treaty between Italy and the United States that 
specifically protected shareholder rights was not limited by the rule from Barcelona Traction). See also 
Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 968 (arguing that the ELSI case demonstrated the ICJ’s 
“implicit rejection” of the application of its strict holding from Barcelona Traction); Laird, supra note 
92, at 85 (“The ELSI case is open to the interpretation that, because the court permitted the US claim, it 
stands for the proposition that the espousal of shareholder claims is permitted under customary 
international law, and that the Barcelona Traction Case has been effectively superseded as the 
statement of international law on this issue.”). 
 99.  See generally Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 
15. 
 100.  See id. ¶ 137. 
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vis-à-vis the shareholders and allowed the United States to represent 
shareholders’ interests, despite the fact that the company still arguably had 
the ability to bring the claim itself.101 International arbitration tribunals 
have noted the ICJ’s apparent shift in their decisions that have since 
departed from Barcelona Traction.102 Accordingly, the continued strength, 
scope, and relevance of Barcelona Traction is open for debate. This lack of 
clarity further calls into question the wisdom of the Agrotexim standard for 
the ECHR’s treatment of shareholder standing, as will be discussed below. 
To summarize these recent developments, it is fair to characterize the 
current state of affairs as a shift away from the Barcelona Traction 
principle by international investment tribunals, and a recent reluctance on 
the part of the ICJ to broadly apply it. These two points are particularly 
salient in light of the ECHR’s reliance on the Barcelona Traction principle 
in Agrotexim.103 Therefore, because of the problems inherent to the 
Barcelona Traction test, as well as its application to the facts of Agrotexim, 
it is time for the ECHR to revisit its jurisprudence and revise the test. The 
next section will demonstrate how the current test has not been applied 
consistently, adding more weight to the argument that it is not as effective a 
standard as it should be. 
B. Highlighting the problems of the ECHR’s current approach 
As demonstrated above, the Agrotexim test for shareholder standing 
before the ECHR is fraught with problems. A comparison of two ECHR 
cases involving shareholder applicants, Agrotexim and Sovtransavto 
Holding v. Ukraine, demonstrates the Court’s inconsistencies in applying 
the test, and reveals why it needs to be revised.104 
First, in Agrotexim the Court immediately reviewed the applicants’ 
standing under Article 34 of the European Convention and solely focused 
on the fact that the company in question could still initiate proceedings at 
 
 101.  Id. The United States lost on the claim for damages. The general consensus in the 
international investment community is that the ICJ had rejected Italy’s narrow and restrictive 
interpretation of the investment treaty, allowing for a much greater protection of American investors 
abroad. 
 102.  “[T]he Elettronica Sicula decision evidences that the International Court of Justice itself 
accepted . . . the protection of shareholders of a corporation by the state of their nationality in spite of 
the fact that the affected corporation had a corporate personality under the defendant state’s legislation.” 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 44 (July 17, 2003). 
 103.  See Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66 (1995). 
 104.  Id.; Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, App. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44 (2002). See 
infra Part III.B for a longer discussion of the decision in the Sovtransavto case. 
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the ECHR on its own behalf.105 Therefore, as far as the Court was 
concerned, the impossibility test was not satisfied.106 
Despite being able to take other factors into account, the ECHR 
neither raised nor evaluated any other factors specific to the facts of the 
case in its analysis, such as the degree of control that the majority 
shareholders exercised, or the amount of harm that they suffered.107 In 
fairness to the ECHR, the applicants did not base their claim on a violation 
of their vested rights as shareholders of the company. Instead, they founded 
their victim status primarily on the ground that the government’s 
interference with the company’s property had adversely harmed their 
financial interests.108 However, the Court also did not consider the amount 
of financial harm to the shareholders in its analysis. 
The Court’s inconsistent approach to evaluating standing under 
Article 34 is apparent in its later judgment, Sovtransavto Holding, a case 
brought by shareholder applicants where the Court did not even address the 
requirements of Article 34.109 In Sovtransavto Holding, a Russian holding 
company’s 49% ownership of a Ukrainian company dropped to 20.7% after 
the managing director of the Ukrainian company increased the company’s 
share capital three times.110 As a result, the shareholder’s rights were 
severely affected: the applicant went from being the controlling shareholder 
to a minority shareholder.111 
After unsuccessful proceedings in Ukrainian court, the applicant filed 
a complaint at the ECHR to declare the decisions of the managing director 
null and void.112 The ECHR did not even address whether or not the 
 
 105.  See Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 66. 
 106.  See id. (“[T]the disregarding of a company’s legal personality will be justified only in 
exceptional circumstances, in particular where it is clearly established that it is impossible for the 
company to apply to the Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of 
incorporation or—in the event of liquidation through its liquidators.”). Again, this line of reasoning is 
potentially problematic due to the ICJ’s distinction between receivership and liquidation in the original 
Barcelona Traction decision. See supra Part I (discussing the flaws in Agrotexim and Barcelona 
Traction and the interaction between both). 
 107.  See Agrotexim, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶¶ 65–71. Additionally, the Court’s reasoning on 
this point is called into question when one recalls that at the time of the submissions to the ECHR, the 
company was under the control of two liquidators as proscribed under Greek law: one liquidator was 
meant to represent the interests of the company, and the other was meant to represent the interests of the 
government, but both were appointed by the Athens Court of Appeal. Id. ¶¶ 20, 60. The applicants 
argued that both liquidators proved to be exclusively loyal to the government, and had not represented 
the company in good faith. Id. ¶ 61. 
 108.  See id. ¶ 62. 
 109.  Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, App. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44 ¶ 93 (2002). 
 110.  Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. ¶¶ 44-47. 
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requirements of Article 34 had been met. Despite the applicant’s status as a 
minority shareholder, which would certainly raise doubts about its ability to 
have separate standing from the company, and the possibility for the 
company to bring the suit itself, Article 34 was merely mentioned briefly in 
the first paragraph of the decision.113 Instead of performing the same 
Article 34 analysis as it performed in Agrotexim, the Court moved straight 
to its analysis under Protocol 1.114 
The differing outcomes in these cases demonstrate that the Agrotexim 
test is insufficient to explain the Court’s reasoning and the progression of 
its analysis in its later cases involving shareholder applicants. Factors that 
feature prominently in some cases are almost completely ignored in 
others.115 Instead of playing this analytical guessing game, the Court should 
unambiguously enunciate the factors that it will consider in evaluating 
shareholders’ victim status. These factors are explained in detail below in 
Part III. 
III. TOWARDS A NEW STANDARD TO DETERMINE 
SHAREHOLDER STANDING BEFORE THE ECHR 
As explained above in Parts I and II, the ECHR’s current standard for 
evaluating whether shareholders are victims under Article 34 of the 
European Convention in order to determine their standing is flawed for 
many reasons. It is uncharacteristically formalistic, founded on cases and 
analyses that may not have been fully applicable, and applied inconsistently 
without sufficient explanation.116 While corporations have benefitted from 
 
 113.  Id. ¶ 1 (“The case originated in an application (no. 48553/99) against Ukraine lodged with the 
Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian company, Sovtransavto Holding (“the applicant company”), 
on 11 May 1999.”). Article 34 was not mentioned again in the decision. 
 114.  See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing how the Court disposed of the Protocol 1 claim on the 
merits in Sovtransavto). A similar scenario played out in Olczak v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 44 
(2002), where the applicant alleged that a decision of the Board of Receivers of a limited liability bank 
caused his shareholding percentage to drop from 45% to 0.4% (they did so by increasing the share 
capital of the bank). The Court held that this constituted a violation of Protocol 1, under its provision 
for deprivation of property, without spending any of its analysis on whether the applicant met the 
standing requirements of Article 34. Id. 
 115.  Sovtransavto Holding, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44; see also OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. 
Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment ¶ 1 (2012) (granting standing to the applicant 
shareholders without a discussion of whether they met the requirements of Article 34); but see OAO 
Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment on Just 
Satisfaction (2014) (Bushev, J., dissenting in part) (“We believe that the majority has in essence 
departed from the Court’s case-law regarding the criteria for assessing a company’s shareholders as 
victims and injured parties.”). 
 116.  See infra Part II. 
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the European Convention’s protections at the ECHR,117 shareholders have 
only benefitted from the Court’s protection under extremely limited 
circumstances, leaving themselves much more vulnerable to government 
actions. Therefore, rather than whittling away at the Agrotexim maxim by 
carving out a variety of exceptions that have been applied inconsistently 
and without sufficient explanation, the ECHR should explicitly adopt a 
more transparent test. 
In particular, the ECHR should use a multifactor test to determine 
whether shareholders should be granted victim status under Article 34 of 
the European Convention and consequently, whether they should have 
standing before the Court. The analysis would include the following 
factors: whether the shareholders claimed that one of their legal rights was 
infringed (as opposed to harm done to their monetary interest), the extent to 
which the shareholders exercised control over the company, whether it was 
impossible for the company to file suit at the ECHR, and the severity of the 
harm that the shareholders suffered.118 
This multifactor test would achieve a number of beneficial results for 
the Court. First, it would help to fill a gap in the ECHR’s jurisprudence, 
since the ECHR does not frequently protect foreign shareholders, despite 
corporations enjoying protection under the European Convention regime.119 
Second, the test would clarify the Court’s reasoning instead of leaving the 
parties and interested scholars to guess which factors are important in the 
Court’s analysis and whether such factors will remain important in the 
future.120 The factors need not all be mandatory for the Court to grant 
standing, but each should be evaluated in connection with the others. 
Finally, such a test would bring the ECHR closer to the practice of 
 
 117.  See, e.g., supra note 7. 
 118.  These factors have been derived from the Court’s analyses in Agrotexim and its later cases 
that treat this issue, in analyzing and reviewing the texts of the decisions to determine what the Court 
has relied on in making its standing determinations. Emberland has also discussed these factors in the 
context of his observation that the Court adopts a flexible approach to applying the Agrotexim standard. 
See Emberland, Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 953-96. This Note goes one step further, in proposing 
that the Court should move from the flexible (and inconsistent) application of a strict rule, to a multi-
factor analysis that explicitly evaluates the most important factors. 
 119.  See Protocol 1, supra note 6, art. 1 (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 120.  Even scholars who are otherwise supportive of this part of the Court’s approach have 
acknowledged the Court’s cryptic approach in its analysis. See Emberland, Human Rights of 
Companies, supra note 5, at 104–05 (“The factors . . . [used by the Court], whether they are found 
expressly in the case law or not, are important because they have immediate bearing on the underlying 
rationale. But the Court . . . also consider[s] other factors, some of them subjective and very concrete, 
which they openly acknowledge to have relevance . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
16_TISHLER_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2015  10:44 PM 
280 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:259 
international investment tribunals. This development would be beneficial to 
both systems by promoting uniform treatment of similarly situated 
claimants and potentially stimulating more productive collaboration 
between the two legal systems.121 
Here, it is important to emphasize that this Note does not advocate that 
the ECHR grant shareholders standing to the extent that arbitral tribunals 
have done so. There are several reasons why the ECHR should be more 
restrictive than international investment tribunals in this area. First, the 
ECHR should not go as far as bilateral investment treaties in granting 
standing to shareholders in order to avoid a further increase in the Court’s 
caseload, which is already backlogged by nearly 100,000 cases.122 It is a 
completely fair concern that if a blanket rule granting shareholder standing 
were adopted, shareholders would bring claims to the Court any time a 
member state did something that decreased the value of their stock. 
Therefore, in the interests of efficiency and the functioning of the Court, a 
test specifically designed to be more restrictive seems legitimate and 
entirely appropriate. 
Second, the ECHR should not come too close to interfering with the 
legal systems of member states that do not allow for separate standing of 
shareholders.123 Imposing shareholder standing in every case could 
incentivize national governments to revise their own corporate laws to 
reflect the approach of the ECHR.124 
Third, there may be other venues better suited than the ECHR to hear 
the majority of the kinds of cases that aggrieved shareholders would like to 
bring, such as complaints regarding the decrease in share value as a result 
of an action by a member state. Investment tribunals, whether ad hoc or 
conducted by ICSID, may be more appropriate fora for such claims, 
particularly where shareholders are explicitly given standing in bilateral 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Schreuer, supra note 80, at 618–19 (citing Stanimir Alexandrov, The ‘Baby-Boom’ 
of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as ‘Investors’ and 
Jurisdiction Rationae Temporis, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 19, 30 (2005)) (noting that “[i]n sum, it is beyond doubt that shareholders have standing in 
ICSID to submit claims separate and independent from the claims of the corporation. Moreover, this 
principle applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they own the majority of the shares or 
control the corporation.”). 
 122.  Owen Bowcott, Backlog at European Court of Human Rights Falls Below 100,000 Cases, 
GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/30/european-court-
human-rights-case-backlog-falls. 
 123.  As Emberland notes, a blanket rule allowing for shareholder standing “would interfere with 
national legislative power” in “the majority of legal systems” of member states. Emberland, Corporate 
Veil, supra note 12, at 965. 
 124.  See id. at 969. 
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investment treaties.125 This is especially true in light of the ECHR’s 
backlog of cases; many shareholders seeking quick relief would likely 
assert their claims elsewhere. 
These considerations demonstrate that the ECHR should not grant 
shareholders standing in all cases. However, it also should not retain its 
misguided approach from Agrotexim. The ECHR should fully revise its test 
for determining whether to grant shareholders standing. Instead of a blanket 
rule that favors shareholder standing, or a presumption against shareholder 
standing that can only be overcome in “exceptional cases,” the Court 
should develop a broader standard that is less restrictive in providing 
shareholders with standing, simply in order to treat shareholders in 
accordance with the objectives of Protocol 1—to protect the property rights 
of legal and natural persons. 
A. Moving toward a new multifactor test 
1. Are the shareholders claiming that their rights were infringed, or 
merely that their financial interests were harmed? 
The first factor of this test would be whether or not the government’s 
actions infringed upon a right of the shareholders in question. This factor 
may seem so obvious that it is not worthy of mentioning, but then again, it 
was the Court’s main concern in Agrotexim.126 The question regarding 
whether rights were violated goes to the heart of Article 34, which states 
that “[t]he Court may receive applications from any person, 
nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set 
forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.”127 Article 34 therefore 
makes clear that standing is dependent on a violation of a right protected by 
the European Convention. 
Therefore, the logical starting point is not whether it was impossible 
for the company to file suit,128 but whether the applicant shareholders are 
claiming that their rights have been violated. Importantly, shareholders 
whose rights are violated are distinguishable from shareholders who simply 
experience a decrease in the value of their stock. The two are not mutually 
exclusive; it is logical that shareholders will bring suit precisely when the 
 
 125.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & USTR, U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 
21(b) (2004) (authorizing shareholders to bring claims under certain conditions). 
 126.  330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 64 (1995). 
 127.  European Convention, supra note 8, art. 34 (emphasis added). 
 128.  See Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 5, at 754 (“[In Agrotexim,] [t]he ECHR agreed that the 
decisive criterion was the impossibility of an application by the company itself.”). 
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value of their investment has decreased, after their rights are violated. 
Examples of identified shareholder rights include dividends issued, voting 
rights, and the right to a share in a company’s assets after liquidation.129 
Whether a right has been violated likely depends on how the 
corporation’s place of domicile would treat the violation under its domestic 
law. While the ECHR has ruled that the term “possessions” in Protocol 1 is 
a concept that is “autonomously” defined outside of domestic law,130  it 
looks to domestic laws to determine whether the state’s conduct violated 
Protocol 1’s protections.131 This factor ensures that the shareholders have a 
rights-based hook to hang their hat on. 
Sovtransavto Holding, discussed above in Part II, exemplifies the kind 
of case whose facts would satisfy this factor.132 The applicant, a Russian 
company that owned 49% of the stock of a Ukrainian company, alleged 
that the Ukrainian company’s managing director had illegally increased the 
share capital three times, thereby decreasing the Russian company’s stake 
to 20.7%.133 In less than a year, the applicant went from being the 
controlling shareholder to a minority shareholder.134 After unsuccessfully 
pursuing and exhausting its claims in Ukrainian court, the applicant filed its 
complaint with the ECHR under Articles 6(1) and 14, as well as Protocol 
1.135 The ECHR determined that there had clearly been an interference with 
the applicant’s property under Protocol 1 because “the shares held by the 
applicant company undoubtedly had an economic value and constituted 
‘possessions.’”136 
Turning to whether or not that interference had been lawful, the Court 
framed the issue as whether the national court decisions in Ukraine were 
consistent with the applicant company’s Protocol 1 right to property, or if 
they had actually interfered with it.137 In light of its earlier determination 
that Ukraine had violated Article 6(1) of the European Convention by 
 
 129.  See, e.g., Marini v. Albania, App. No. 3738/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 165–67 (2007) (noting that 
ownership of company stock grants the owner an “indirect claim on company assets, [and also] other 
rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company”). 
 130.  See, e.g., Beyeler v. Italy, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, ¶ 100 (“[P]ossessions in the first part of 
Article 1 has an autonomous meaning which . . . is independent from the formal classification in 
domestic law.”). 
 131.  See Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 5, at 745 (“[T]he ECHR has given significance to the 
treatment under domestic law of the property in question before the interference.”). 
 132.  Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, App. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44, ¶ 93 (2004). 
 133.  Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. ¶ 44–47. 
 136.  Id. ¶ 91. 
 137.  Id. ¶ 95. 
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denying the applicant a fair hearing, the Court held that “the unfair manner 
in which the proceedings in issue were conducted had a direct impact on 
the applicant company’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of its 
possessions.”138 The Court concluded that therefore, Ukraine had also 
violated the applicant minority shareholder’s rights under Protocol 1.139 Of 
particular concern to the Court were the unfairness of the proceedings and 
the uncertainty of the resulting judgments, which “upset the ‘fair balance’ 
that has to be struck between the demands of the public interest” and the 
Protocol 1 property rights of the applicant shareholder.140 
Accordingly, Sovtransavto Holding was not merely about the decrease 
in the value of the applicant shareholder’s shares. While there was a sharp 
decrease in value, the shareholder-specific rights that the applicant 
shareholder enjoyed as majority shareholder were also infringed, all of 
which stemmed from the original right to ownership of a company’s 
stock.141 Beyond shareholder-specific rights, the applicant shareholder 
demonstrated that the government had interfered with its property. 
Therefore, the value of its investment had decreased by virtue of the 
Ukrainian court’s refusal to provide a clear resolution to the case.142 
2. How much control do the shareholders exercise over the company? 
The degree of control that shareholders exercise is another factor that 
the ECHR should consider in weighing shareholder standing. The Court 
has found this criteria persuasive on at least two occasions where the 
applicants owned over 90% of a company’s shares and were “carrying out 
parts [of their] business through [the company]” to such an extent that they 
had “direct personal interest[s] in the subject matter of the application.”143 
Even where the ownership does not approach 100%, the degree of 
shareholder control is clearly an important element to consider, particularly 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. ¶ 97. 
 140.  Id. ¶ 98. 
 141.  See also Bramelid and Malmstrom v. Sweden, App. Nos. 8588/79 and 8589/79, 29 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64, 81 (1982) (holding that the forced sale of shares to the majority owner 
of the company was a violation of Protocol 1 because the shares were “possessions 
 that triggered the right of ownership); see also Marini v. Albania, App. No. 3738/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 
165–67 (2007); cf. Schreuer, supra note 80, at 618 (citing Alexandrov, supra note 121, at 4561) 
(explaining that investment arbitration tribunals have gone even further in defining the rights of 
shareholders: “[i]t is clear that [arbitral tribunals] all considered it to be beyond doubt that a 
shareholder’s interest in a company includes an interest in the assets of the company, including its 
licenses, contractual rights, rights under law, claims to money or economic preference, etc.”). 
 142.  Sovtransavto Holding, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44, ¶ 97. 
 143.  G.J. v. Luxembourg, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 750, ¶ 24 (2003); Camberrow MM5 AD v. Bulgaria, 
App. No. 50357/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 1 (2004). 
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as it is more frequently cited by other international tribunals.144 
Control does not only refer to the monetary stake that shareholders 
have in a given company. It also refers to the shareholders’ personal 
involvement with the company, for example, if the applicant shareholder is 
a director or officer of the company. This consideration was significant in 
Pine Valley Developments Limited and Others v. Ireland.145 The issue was 
whether Ireland had unlawfully interfered with property that Pine Valley 
Developments owned, as defined by Protocol 1.146 In addition to Pine 
Valley Developments, its sole shareholder, Healy Holding Ltd., and that 
entity’s sole shareholder, Mr. Healy, joined the suit as applicants.147 In 
reviewing the applicants’ respective standing under Article 34, the Court 
held that “it would be artificial to draw distinctions between the three 
applicants as regards their entitlement to claim to be ‘victims’ of a 
violation” because Pine Valley and Healy Holdings were simply “vehicles” 
through which Mr. Healy would implement the development of the 
property.148 Accordingly, the Court granted victim status to all three parties 
under Article 34.149 
3. To what extent was it practically possible for the company to file 
suit on its own? 
Another possible factor is the extent to which it was possible for the 
company itself to bring the claim before the ECHR. The Court in 
Agrotexim cited a version of this factor that relied on a hypothetical 
impossibility test.150 However, the impossibility test should rely on 
practical considerations.151 Impossibility will be present most clearly 
“when the applicant company has ceased to be a legal personality 
altogether.”152 However, impossibility may also occur if the “circumstances 
in a given case . . . suggest that the corporate person itself [is] effectively 
 
 144.  The European Commission noted in Agrotexim that the shareholder’s control of the 
company’s shares is an “objective and important indication” of its victim status. Agrotexim and Others 
v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) ¶ 156 (1995); see also Dumberry, supra note 96, at 357–58 
(describing how international arbitral tribunals have considered the issue of control). 
 145. Pine Valley Dev. Ltd. v. Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 42 (1992). See also Kaplan v. 
United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44, ¶ 130 (1980) (holding that the applicant’s interest in the outcome 
of the litigation “arose from his investment interest in the company and his position as an officer”). 
 146.  Pine Valley Dev. Ltd., 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 1. 
 147.  Id. Neither Healy Holding Ltd. nor Mr. Healy had been involved in the first domestic 
proceedings against the Irish government. They joined as plaintiffs in later proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
 148.  Id. ¶ 42. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See infra Part I.B. 
 151.  See Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 5, at 94–95. 
 152.  Id. at 95. 
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unable to pursue the claim.”153 Accordingly, rather than using the general 
standard of hypothetical impossibility, practical impossibility is a more 
clear and accurate standard. Even if the company still technically exists and 
it is therefore not impossible for it to file suit at the ECHR, it may 
nevertheless be practically impossible to do so because of particular 
circumstances—for example, when government-appointed liquidators are 
not actually acting in the interests of the shareholders. 
The ECHR addressed this issue in G.J. v. Luxembourg, a case whose 
facts are more clear-cut than those in Agrotexim.154 The applicant 
shareholder brought suit against the Luxembourg government, contesting 
the actions that the company’s liquidators had taken.155 The Court 
determined that the applicant had victim status because the effective 
control of the government made it impossible for the company to bring the 
case.156 Other potential cases of practical impossibility may arise if, under 
domestic law, shareholders themselves are generally prohibited from 
bringing certain kinds of suits.157 
4. What was the severity of the harm that the shareholders suffered as 
a result of the government’s actions? 
Finally, the severity of the harm that the shareholders actually suffered 
as a result of measures taken by the government should also be considered. 
This factor should not be considered in absolute numerical terms. Instead, it 
should be judged by the harm done to the shareholders’ specific investment 
relative to their initial investment and the rights they enjoyed at that time.158 
For example, in Yukos v. Russia, the harm suffered was severe. After the 
Putin government confiscated the assets of Yukos—the largest oil company 
in Russia at the time—its shareholders brought claims at the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at the Hague and received an award of $50 billion, as 
 
 153.  Id. at 96. 
 154.  36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 750, ¶ 23 (2003). 
 155.  Id. In this case, the company’s liquidators were the official receiver and the Commercial 
Court. 
 156.  Id. ¶ 24. Again, the inconsistency of the Court’s approach on this point is evident when one 
recalls the facts of Agrotexim. Emberland notes that “[i]t seems that the more directly involved an organ 
of the State has been in the alleged contravention,” the more likely it is that the shareholder’s complaint 
will be admissible. Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 5, at 106. Why this was 
insufficient for the facts of Agrotexim is unclear. 
 157.  See Emberland, Human Rights of Companies, supra note 5, at 95–99 (discussing the various 
facets of the impossibility argument). 
 158.  See, e.g., Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, Ap. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44, ¶¶ 11–
13 (2002) (The Russian shareholder went from being the controlling shareholder to a minority 
shareholder in less than a year, after the share capital was illegally increased three times, which 
decreased the Russian shareholder’s stake by more than half). 
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well as a $2.5 billion award from the ECHR.159 If the shareholders did not 
substantively suffer great financial harm or other prejudice to their rights 
(for example, dividends issued, voting rights, and the right to a share in a 
company’s assets after liquidation), the Court may have less reason to grant 
the shareholders standing, especially when other concerns weigh against 
allowing the suit to proceed.160 
While this is not an exhaustive list of criteria that the ECHR could 
use, such a multifactor approach would clarify the rationale that the Court 
uses to reach a decision, therefore making it easier for potential applicants 
to determine whether they will be granted “victim” status when bringing 
suit. It would also enable the Court to adopt the modern doctrine for 
shareholder standing that other international tribunals use, while providing 
the Court with enough discretion to continue pursuing the goals and 
policies enshrined in Protocol 1. Under this proposed test, the Court could 
treat shareholders’ property rights similar to how it treats corporations’ 
property rights, resulting in more consistent jurisprudence.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has outlined the ECHR’s current shareholder property rights 
jurisprudence in order to illustrate the weaknesses of the Court’s approach 
in determining shareholder standing and argue for a new standard. It has 
demonstrated the flaws in the Court’s current approach to grant shareholder 
standing under Agrotexim v. Greece, especially in light of the case’s factual 
and legal foundations. Some commentators have argued that the Court’s 
treatment of shareholder claims allows for sufficient flexibility to weigh all 
the factors of a case.161 However, the Court has given little clarity to what 
factors it actually uses, to the detriment of shareholders who should be able 
to rely on more predictable outcomes. Furthermore, the current standard 
has led to inequitable results because the Court has thoroughly examined 
 
 159.  See Neil Buckley, Former Yukos Shareholders Awarded $50bn Damages Against Russia, 
THE FINANCIAL TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5824afa-1623-11e4-8210-0014 
4feabdc0.html#axzz38kWHDIZA; see also Andrew E. Kramer, A Victory for Holders of Yukos, THE 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at B1 (describing the arbitral claims brought by Yukos shareholders); 
Michael D. Goldhaber, ECHR Piles on Russia with $2.5 Billion Yukos Award, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 
(July 31, 2014), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202665495907/ECHR-Piles-on-Russia-With-25-
Billion-Yukos-Award?slreturn=20140902083029 (describing the litigation at the ECHR and the Court’s 
award). 
 160.  Emberland, supra note 5 at 106 (citing Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and Others v. 
Finland, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 69, ¶ 1 (1996) (noting that the Commission considered the 
“minor amounts at stake” in its decision to judge the claims inadmissible under Article 34)). 
 161.  Emberland in particular has been a proponent of this characterization. See Emberland, 
Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 953–56 (discussing the Court’s “inescapable element of flexibility” 
when evaluating shareholder standing). 
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shareholder standing in some cases and not at all in others. 
To address these issues, this Note has proposed a multifactor test for 
determining whether shareholders have met the “victim” requirement of 
Article 34 of the European Convention, and consequently whether they 
should have standing before the Court. The multifactor test would include 
the following factors: whether the shareholders claim that one of their legal 
rights was infringed upon (as opposed to their monetary interest being 
harmed), the shareholders’ degree of control over the company, the extent 
to which it was impossible for the company to file suit, and the severity of 
the harm that the shareholders suffered. This approach would help to 
elucidate the Court’s reasoning in order to provide greater certainty to 
future shareholder applicants. 
As international investment increases, corporations and shareholders 
will continue to seek investment opportunities that predictably and 
sufficiently protect their interests. The European Union is the world’s 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment, with more than €3 trillion in 
2014, accounting for 25.4% of total global inward investment flows.162  
This will surely increase as the global economy continues to recover from 
the events of the late 2000s.163 With such important sums at stake, the 
ECHR should reevaluate its jurisprudence on shareholder property rights so 
that shareholders may enjoy the full protection granted to them under the 
European Convention. 
 
 
 162.  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TRADE AND INVESTMENT 2014 9 (2012), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152062.pdf; see also EU27 investment flows 
with the rest of the world recovered in 2011, 88 EUROSTAT 2012, June 13, 2012, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-13062012-BP/EN/2-13062012-BP-EN.PDF. 
 163.  Id. 
